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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was proper under UCA 
§78-2-2(3)(j). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by assignment 
from the Supreme Court pursuant to UCA §78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The defendant, Brett Allen Olsen, claims that the trial 
court committed error in denying his motion for change of venue. 
A change of venue should be ordered if the trial court "is 
satisfied that the representations made" by the moving party 
support a finding that "a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in 
the" county where the action is pending. Rule 29(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The trial court should be "satisfied" with a 
finding that there exists "a reasonable likelihood that a fair 
trial cannot be had unless the motion is granted." State v. James, 
767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989). The defendant has the burden to show 
"reasonable likelihood", but that burden does not rise to a 
probability. The ruling of the trial court is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. State v. James, supra, at 551. Case law extant 
holds that the ultimate test as to whether a denial of a motion for 
change of venue constitutes an abuse of discretion is whether a 
defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury. State v. Cayer, 
814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1250 (Utah 1988). However, defendant contends that this standard 
of review is erroneous because it calls for an after-the-fact 
analysis which is only applicable to harmless error analysis. 
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Olsen contends that James suggests a different standard of review 
which must analyze whether the trial court had evidence sufficient 
to find a reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial, 
Olsen objected to evidence of prior crimes pursuant to 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence. Nevertheless, evidence of that 
nature was admitted. The admission of evidence under Rule 404 is 
a question of law and should be reviewed for correctness. 
Subsidiary factual determinations, if any, should be given 
deference by the appellate court only if clearly erroneous. State 
v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (920439-CA, February 12, 1993). 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991). Reversal is 
required if the reviewing court concludes that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the error in admitting the improper 
evidence affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1989) . 
Defendant also contends that comment upon his prior 
criminal history constituted prosecutorial misconduct. A 
prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error if they 
bring to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not 
be justified in considering. Whether the information should be 
considered by the jury is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. Improper statements require reversal if harmful. 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). The reviewing court 
analyzes the matter of harm by determining whether the error is 
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substantial and prejudicial so as to create a reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error there would have been a more favorable result 
for the defendant. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). 
Failure to object to improper remarks by a prosecutor 
will constitute waiver unless the remarks constitute plain error. 
In order to constitute plain error, the error must harmful and 
obvious. The reviewing court analyzes allegations of plain error 
despite timely objection. State v. Emmett, supra, at 781. 
Reversal is reguired if the error affects the substantial rights of 
a party and a reviewing court is convinced that a reasonable 
likelihood exists that absent the error the outcome below would 
have been more favorable. State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah 
1989) . 
Defendant sought to introduce evidence of child abuse 
suffered by him to support his claim that he was mentally ill. His 
expert witness relied upon the existence of child abuse in reaching 
his opinion. The court admitted the expert opinion of the doctor, 
but prohibited defendant from introducing direct evidence of 
childhood abuse. The trial court grounded its ruling in relevancy. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was not only relevant, but that 
it was the centerpiece of his case. The only issue in the case was 
whether defendant's mental illness negated the intent element of 
the crime. The trial court deprived him of the opportunity to 
develop that defense by prohibiting testimony concerning child 
abuse. The standard of review with reference to this issue is that 
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of correctness. Whether evidence is admissible is a question of 
law. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Reversal is 
required if an erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence is 
harmful. Harm exists when there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992). 
Defendant contends that the evidence was inconclusive 
concerning the issue of his state of mind, and that the prosecution 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite 
mental intent to commit the crime of murder. He bases that claim 
upon the fact that each of the three experts who testified 
concluded that he suffered from mental illness, two concluded he 
had diminished mental capacity, and one concluded that the 
diminished mental capacity negated the intent element required by 
law for a conviction. The standard of review of an insufficiency 
of evidence argument calls for the appellate court to review the 
evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the verdict. Reversal is warranted when the 
evidence so viewed is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Olsen was charged with murder in violation of UCA §7 6-5-
203 (Supp. 1992), a first degree felony. He was convicted after 
jury trial held on October 29 and 30, 1992. The verdict was 
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"guilty and mentally ill." Olsen appealed the verdict to the Utah 
Supreme Court (Case No. 920554), and the case was poured-over to 
this court for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Brett Allen Olsen, stabbed the victim, 
William Paul Jensen, with a knife (T. 109) at Salina, Utah, on 
September 7, 1991 (T. 100). Jensen died the next day at the Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center, Provo, Utah where he had been taken 
for emergency treatment (T. 129). Death resulted from the stab 
wound complications (T. 136). 
Olsen and Jensen were friends of many years (T. 159). 
Jensen was 32 years old and Olsen was 23 (T. 95). 
The scene of the homicide was a vacant lot (T. 101) in 
Salina where young people gather to socialize (T. 101-04). Olsen 
and Jensen were present and argued about whether Jensen was 
remaining sober (T. 105). A fight resulted (T. 106). Jensen 
prevailed after wrestling Olsen to the ground and butting him, head 
to head (T. 107). Olsen admitted having had too much to drink and 
left in his car (T. 107). He returned 5 minutes later with a 
knife, apparently in an angry or disturbed state of mind (T. 108), 
and jumped at Jensen and stabbed him (T. 109). Jensen removed the 
knife and used it to slash the tires on Olsen's car (T. 109). 
Police officers were contacted (T. 109), and Jensen was taken from 
the scene by ambulance (T. 110). 
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Olsen was arrested a few hours later at the home of his 
parents in Salina (T. 143). He did not resist arrest and remained 
quiet. He was not interviewed by the police (T. 144, 145, and 
146) . 
Olsen escaped from custody on October 13, 1991 (T. 97). 
He was again apprehended 4 days later (T. 119). The escape 
generated massive publicity about the case (T. 90-184). 
Olsen was committed to the Utah State Hospital on October 
23, 1991 for competency studies (T. 25). He was found incompetent 
to stand trial (T. 256) and was confined at the hospital until 
August, 1992. The examiners then reported that competency had been 
restored and preliminary hearing was scheduled for August 14, 1992, 
but the trial court again found Olsen incompetent and he was 
returned to the State Hospital for a further psychiatric evaluation 
(T. 45). Preliminary hearing finally occurred on September 14, 
1992 (T. 69). 
Notice of insanity defense was given on September 22, 
19 92 (T. 76) and insanity studies were completed by Dr. Robert J. 
Howell (T. 192) for the defense, and Drs. Bert P. Cundick (T. 236) 
and Richard R. Wootton (T. 253) for the prosecution. All were 
psychologists and each testified at trial. 
Olsen was diagnosed as mentally ill at age 15 (T. 218). 
He had been hospitalized and treated extensively over a period of 
many years (T. 199-200). Records of mental health treatment of 
Olsen were voluminous (T. 257). 
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The sole issue at trial was whether Olsen's mental 
illness negated the requisite mens rea for the crime of murder. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Olsen sought a change of venue from Sevier County to any 
other county in the state except Wayne and Piute. His escape 
attracted extensive publicity and community awareness was 
heightened because of door to door contact with residents by police 
officers, an open-mike forum on the local radio station, bloodhound 
searches, and multi-police agency participation. Pretrial 
publicity was equal to or greater than that in State v. James, 7 67 
P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), including the unique factor of community 
involvement, with a clear showing that there existed a reasonable 
likelihood that Olsen could not receive a fair trial absent a 
change of venue. The facts offered by Olsen to support his motion 
were not controverted. The court denied the motion in the face of 
substantial evidence indicating a fair trial could not be held in 
Sevier County. 
The defense sought to prohibit introduction into evidence 
of other crimes which had been committed by Olsen. A motion in 
limine was granted. However, the prosecution made repeated 
references to defendant's criminal history during direct and cross-
examination of witnesses, and again during closing argument. 
Evidence of that nature is inadmissible under Rule 404, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, and the flagrancy of the comments constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct. The harm to defendant was particularly 
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acute because the central issue in the case was his state of mind. 
Olsen contended that he did not intend to harm or kill 
the victim because of diminished mental capacity resulting from 
mental illness. To support the claim of mental illness, he offered 
the opinion of an expert witness, and evidence of significant abuse 
which he received as a child. The existence of child abuse was 
relied upon by his expert witness, and to some extent by the 
state's expert witnesses. However, the court declined to admit 
evidence concerning child abuse when offered by testimony from 
Olsen's mother. The court held the evidence to be irrelevant, 
contrary to the liberal standard for admissibility of evidence 
regarding motive and state of mind. The exclusion of that evidence 
was particularly damaging to Olsen's case because it prevented him 
from developing his only defense. 
The three experts who testified agreed that Olsen was 
mentally ill. One expert testified that the mental illness did not 
negate the intent element for murder. A second expert found that 
the mental illness did negate an intent to kill, but that it did 
not negate an intent to harm the victim. Defendant's expert 
concluded that the mental illness negated any intent applicable to 
murder. Thus, the evidence regarding Olsen's state of mind was 
conflicting and inconsistent, and did not meet the burden of proof 
on the part of the prosecution which required proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he had the requisite mental capacity to 
commit the offense. The issue is compounded because Olsen was not 
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allowed to fully adduce his evidence of mental illness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Olsen filed a pretrial motion for a change of venue (R. 
78). The motion was supported by a memorandum (R. 127), and 
numerous affidavits reflecting case publicity by the electronic and 
print media (T. 90-184). The affidavits were not controverted. 
The motion was denied by the trial court during a telephone 
conference with counsel (R. 185). Neither findings nor comment 
accompanied the ruling of the court. No evidentiary hearing was 
ordered to explore the alleged prejudice. Olsen asserted that a 
fair and impartial trial could not be had in Sevier County, and 
requested a change of venue to any county within the state other 
than Wayne and Piute (R. 127). Wayne and Piute counties were 
excluded because local newspaper circulation in those counties 
paralleled that of Sevier County (R. 143). Olsen grounded his 
motion in both federal and state constitutions and Rule 29(e), Utah 
R.Crim.P. (R. 127-28). 
Olsen cited the case of State v. James, 767 P. 2d 549 
(Utah 1989) to support his position, and argued that his 
circumstances favorably met the four-factor test articulated in 
that case. 
The homicide in James occurred in Logan, Utah. The 
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victim was a 3-month-old infant. Extensive publicity resulted. 
Defendant was charged with a capital offense. He was the father of 
the victim. He initially reported that the child was missing from 
a parked car which he left in a parking lot. Media coverage 
focused upon an effort to find the missing child. Local volunteers 
organized and assisted in the search. The remains of the infant 
were found two months later in a marsh freguented by duck hunters. 
Decomposition had begun, and forensic analysis was necessary for 
identification. 
The opinion in James defined the standard which should 
govern a trial court in a venue issue. The absence of a well 
defined standard before that time was noted, and, in citing three 
California cases as well as Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 
S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), the court concluded that a 
motion for change of venue should be granted upon finding "a 
reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot be had unless the 
motion is granted" (James at 552). The term "reasonable 
likelihood" was construed as something less than a probability 
(James at 552) . 
The court in James then analyzed four factors to 
determine the potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity, 
although those factors were not viewed as exclusive. The first 
factor is the standing of the accused and the victim in the 
community. The defendant in James and his girlfriend lived 
together in Logan for only two weeks before the child disappeared. 
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The defendant had long hair and wore an earring. There was some 
indication that he had been a drug user. Thus, community standing 
was almost nonexistent. In the case at bar, both Olsen and Jensen 
were longtime residents of the community (R. 128). Both had 
families who operated small businesses within Sevier County (R. 
147). Those facts place the venue issue on much stronger footing 
than James. 
The next factor analyzed by the court in James was the 
size of the community. The court noted that Logan then had a 
population of approximately 29,000, and that Cache County had an 
estimated population of 69,000, observing that the smaller the 
community, the more likely the need for a change of venue when the 
case presents a serious crime. James, at 553. Again, the facts in 
the case at bar are stronger than those in James. The population 
of Salina is approximately 2,000 people, and the population of 
Sevier County is approximately 15,000 people (R. 128). 
A third factor analyzed by James was the nature and 
gravity of the offense. Admittedly, the nature of the crime in 
James is more repulsive and heinous than the homicide in this case. 
The victim in James was a 3-month-old child who was submerged in a 
river and weighted down with rocks. Defendant was charged with a 
capital offense. In this matter the charge was murder, a non-
capital offense, and the homicide occurred after an altercation 
between two adults. 
The final factor analyzed in James was the nature and 
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extent of pretrial publicity. Coverage by television and radio 
stations as well as two local news papers was noted. The media 
items were numbered, and the adverse content as it related to the 
defendant was discussed. James, at 554. 
In reaching its conclusion the court in James was 
persuaded by the unique factor of significant community involvement 
in the effort to locate the missing child. The court stated (at 
554) : 
This effort touched many adults, school children, and 
businesses. They responded with money, material, and 
countless hours of labor. This community involvement 
brought may people much closed to this alleged crime than 
ordinarily occurs. 
Observing that the trial judge stated that despite 
significant media coverage he was of the opinion that twelve jurors 
could be found without bias or prejudice against the defendant, the 
court in James stated (at 555): 
We believe, however, that the instant case presents a set 
of circumstances not usually found in criminal cases. 
Here, the impact of the alleged crime reached deeply into 
the community. Not only were residents exposed to media 
information on almost a daily basis, but also many adults 
and children assisted in one way or another in the month 
and one-half search effort. Although we do not doubt 
that twelve persons could be found who could honestly 
promise to set aside any prejudicial information which 
they had heard and any preconceived notions which they 
had formed, there are limits to what should reasonably be 
asked and expected of prospective jurors who have been 
exposed to the events surrounding the alleged crime. 
In holding that venue should be changed, the court in 
James was keenly aware that the venue issue was presented before 
trial of the case and that a change of venue to another county 
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would avoid the potential of a second trial if the first were found 
to be infirm because of adverse publicity. Contrasted with that 
situation, the case at bar presents a look at an accomplished trial 
and the focus is in the opposite direction. 
The venue issue is analogous to fourth amendment 
jurisprudence. The legality of a search does not turn on whether 
contraband is found, but on whether probable cause exists when the 
search is undertaken. A venue issue must be analyzed "through the 
eyes of the trial court" in order to preserve the integrity of the 
standard announced in James. Otherwise, the trial court is left 
with only "half the marbles" in its decision making process. 
Strict adherence to the standard in James would also 
suggest that earlier case law has marched to a different drummer. 
In State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439 (1988), the Utah Supreme court 
utilized an "after-the-fact" analysis. 
After reviewing the record, we hold without reservation that 
the publicity and attendant circumstances in this case did not 
amount to "one of those exceptional cases where pretrial 
publicity exacerbated by State complicity encouraged the 
jurors to form such strong preconceived views of the 
defendant's guilt as to be considered inherently prejudicial 
against him. (Quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1349 
(Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 
L.Ed.2d 194 (1978)). 
The court in Bishop also placed a near impossible burden 
upon a defendant who claims prejudice at the trial level: 
Thus, defendant has the burden of demonstrating the 
existence of actual prejudice on his appeal (p. 459). 
The test utilized by the court in James is a radical 
departure from that employed in Bishop and much of the case law 
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which preceded those decisions. 
If the standard in James is applied to the facts of the 
instant matter, it is apparent that the trial court committed error 
in refusing to grant Olsen's motion for change of venue. The 
standing of Olsen and Jensen in the community was of much greater 
significance than the situation in James. The size of the 
community (Salina with a population of 2,000, and Sevier County 
with a population of 15,000) also weighs in favor of Olsen. 
Although the murder charge in this case is less serious 
than the capital offense in James, the pretrial publicity is in 
many respects a more compelling factor. Olsen escaped from custody 
shortly after his arrest for the homicide. An extensive manhunt 
ensued. Media coverage exploded. Kent L. Colby, owner and 
operator of KKWZ FM and KSVC AM, a radio station broadcasting from 
Richfield, detailed coverage of both the homicide and Olsen's 
escape, by affidavits filed in support of the motion for change of 
venue (R. 85 and 164). The radio station broadcasts continuously 
24 hours each day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, on both its AM 
and FM wave lengths (R. 164-65). The Colby affidavits identify at 
least sixteen broadcasts (R. 165-66). The station reaches all 
areas within Sevier County and to some extent areas in surrounding 
regions (R. 164) . 
The contents of the Richfield radio station broadcasts, 
focusing primarily upon the escape and the capture of Olsen, 
present highly inflammatory media coverage. The broadcast of 
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October 14, 1991 (R. 168) stated the following: 
The sheriff's office advises all county residents to keep 
their homes and cars locked and not to leave keys in 
cars...Sheriff's posse has been called out. 
The broadcast of October 15, 1991 (R. 173) stated that 
tracking dogs were called to the area to assist in the search for 
Olsen and that a local business had been burglarized, intimating 
that Olsen was the burglar. That broadcast also reported the 
following: 
Earlier, patrol cars cruised Richfield neighborhoods, 
using loudspeakers to warn residents to lock their doors. 
The radio broadcast of October 14, 1991 (R. 174) stated: 
More than 40 lawmen have been going door-to-door in 
Richfield neighborhoods alerting residents and looking 
for clues to the whereabouts of Olsen...Meacham (Sevier 
County Sheriff) says he should be considered dangerous. 
On October 16, 1991 (R. 176), the Richfield radio station 
aired information concerning road blocks and the use of search 
dogs. The broadcast stated: 
A (sic) exhaustive manhunt under the direction of the 
Sevier County Sheriff's office started off with road 
block's (sic) on almost all county roads and warnings to 
citizens... Search dogs and a bloodhound were brought in 
and all tracks ended on the highway. 
The community was alarmed because of the escape by Olsen, 
and apparently fingers were pointed at the Sheriff's department. 
The broadcast of October 16, 1991 (R. 177) stated: 
We have asked Sheriff, (sic) John Meacham to be on open 
mike to bring us up to date and confirm or deny 
negligence on the departments (sic) part for allowing an 
alleged killer out on the streets. Meacham has declined 
our invitation. 
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Apparently Sheriff Meacham had a change of heart 
concerning his participation in a live radio broadcast. Later in 
the day on October 16, 1991 (R. 179), the radio station broadcast 
the following: 
Sheriff John Meacham was on KSVC's open mike Wednesday 
and responded to a barrage of calls from listeners asking 
everything from the forming of vigilante groups to the 
amount of fire power police are packing. Meacham also 
received many calls praising his department and the work 
they are doing. Carolyn Jensen, the mother of slain, 32 
year old Paul Jensen, the victim of the murder that Brett 
Olsen is being charged with, called to praise the police 
and their efforts. Mrs. Jensen said she did not feel she 
was in any more danger than anyone else, but she does 
feel apprehensive. She also stated that she felt 
everything that can be done is being done and that she 
hopes no one else is hurt in the process. Meacham said 
their (sic) have been reports of Olsen being seen in 
other parts of the state and that all calls are being 
checked out. 
KSL television, broadcasting from Salt Lake City, with 
coverage throughout Sevier County, aired thirty two broadcasts 
during September and October, 1991 (R. 90-91). Those broadcasts 
were both with and without video coverage. 
KUTV television (channel 2, Salt Lake City) issued 
fifteen broadcasts during the same two months (R. 92-123). Those 
broadcasts focused on the escape from custody by Olsen, and 
detailed the door-to-door search in Richfield (R. 97, 101). The 
television reports by KUTV also made repeated references to Olsen 
being dangerous (R. 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 110, 113, 115, and 
118). KUTV also reported that Olsen escaped by overpowering a 
guard (R. 99), an assertion which was also repeatedly aired by 
other media. 
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The KUTV television reports echoed local media broadcasts 
by indicating the large number of officers involved in the search 
(R. 106), and repeated the warnings to local citizens to stay off 
the streets and lock their homes (R. 109-111). KUTV added credence 
to the allegation that Olsen committed the store burglary while at 
large (R. 112), and detailed the use of bloodhounds and prison dogs 
to aid in the search (R. 114). The last broadcast by KUTV (R. 122) 
stated: 
...All this week, residents of Richfield and Salina and 
points in between have been on the lookout. 
KTVX television (channel 4, Salt Lake City) aired eleven 
broadcasts concerning the Olsen case during October and November, 
1991. The Deseret News with a weekly circulation in Sevier County 
of 911 issues, and a Sunday circulation of 1,596 issues, printed 19 
articles concerning the Olsen case beginning in September, 1991 (R. 
137 and 140). 
The Salt Lake Tribune printed 6 articles in October and 
November, 1991 (R. 141). 
The most pervasive publicity relating to the Olsen case 
emanated from The Richfield Reaper, a weekly newspaper with 
circulation throughout Sevier, Wayne, and Piute counties (R. 143-
45). The Richfield Reaper has a weekly circulation within Sevier 
County alone of 4,796 copies. The publications dealing with the 
Olsen case were submitted as attachments to the affidavit of Mark 
G. Fullenbach, The Richfield Reaper publisher (R. 143, 147-63). 
The contents of those articles included the following: 
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Olsen is the murder suspect (R. 147) 
Olsen is held without bail (R. 148) 
Olsen caused the death of a friend (R. 147) 
Olsen committed the homicide by stabbing with a knife (R. 
147) 
The escape resulted in three road blocks with all 
vehicles being checked (R. 151) 
The escape produced house-to-house warning of Richfield 
citizens by police officers (R. 151) 
A store burglary was attributed to Olsen (R. 152) 
Search dogs were used from the Central Utah Correctional 
Center in Gunnison (R. 152) 
The Sheriff's mounted posse was employed (R. 152) 
Two county search and rescue units were used (R. 152) 
The Utah Highway Patrol participated (R. 152) 
Police officers from the Richfield City Police Department 
and the Salina Police Department assisted (R. 152) 
A S.W.A.T. team aided the search (R. 152) 
Three canine units reported from Central Utah 
Correctional Facility in Gunnison (R. 152) 
The Richfield Reaper article of October 23, 1991 (R. 153) 
reported that over 100 lawmen participated in the search for Olsen, 
The issue of December 4, 1991 (R. 156) detailed prior criminal 
activity on the part of Olsen. That publication stated: 
Olsen has a long history of criminal misconduct, 
including twenty six appearances in juvenile court. Past 
offenses have ranged from improper vehicle registration 
and misdemeanor thefts to aggravated assault and 
burglary. Olsen has also had a history of drug and 
alcohol problems. 
In November of 1987 Olsen beat a man with brass knuckles 
during a fight, resulting in his subsequent prison 
incarceration for aggravated assault. 
The Richfield Reaper edition of August 5, 1992 (R. 159), 
in commenting upon the escape and re-capture of Olsen, stated: 
A full-scale manhunt erupted a little more than a month 
later when Olsen overpowered a Sevier County jailer and 
escaped. He was at large from October 13 until being 
recaptured on October 17 at the home of a former 
girlfriend. 
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In sum, the Olsen case produced publicity regarding an 
extensive manhunt, numerous roadblocks, door-to-door warnings to 
citizens by police officers, drive-by warnings to citizens with 
loudspeakers, and police units and bloodhounds from surrounding 
areas, all combining to produce a public debate by the local radio 
station which focused upon allegations that the Sevier County 
Sheriff's Department was negligent in permitting Olsen to escape. 
The prejudicial nature of that radio broadcast was compounded by 
airing comments from the victim's mother. An entire community was 
alarmed. It is hardly imaginable that any adult person in Sevier 
County was unaware of the Olsen saga. The publicity factor in 
James pales in comparison. 
The voir dire process revealed evidence of the pretrial 
publicity. After prospective jurors were qualified, 16 were 
selected for the preliminary panel (T. 19). Questioning by the 
court followed (T. 22). One panel member was excused after 
indicating possible prejudice (T. 51) and a replacement was seated 
(T. 52). When asked about knowledge of the case, 7 of the 16 panel 
members responded in the affirmative (T. 54). One of the 7 was 
excused after admitting she had formed an opinion which would 
impair her judgment (T. 56). Another was excused for the same 
reason (T. 58). Replacements were called and the court then 
repeated his questions to the panel as to whether opinions, formed 
or expressed, could be set aside and a decision rendered solely on 
the evidence (T. 60). The question produced no response and the 
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voir dire continued on another subject (T. 60), Hence, 5 panel 
members remained who had acknowledged pre-conceived opinions about 
the case. The nature of those opinions was never explored. The 
record does not reveal whether any of the panel members with 
opinions eventually served as trial jurors. However, the 
likelihood that pretrial publicity impacted the jurors is near 
certain. 
In sum, a strong showing was made by Olsen that there was 
a "reasonable likelihood" that he could not receive a fair trial 
absent a change of venue. "Subsequent court proceedings in a 
community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but 
a hollow formality." Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724, 83 
S.Ct. 1417, 1418, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963). 
POINT II 
OTHER CRIMINAL CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
Catherine Olsen, defendant's mother, was called as a 
witness by the defense (T. 151). The state's cross-examination of 
Mrs. Olsen was initiated by a question which asked about Olsen's 
prior involvement with the juvenile court (T. 164-65). The defense 
then objected during a bench conference (T. 165). However, the 
trial court did not enjoin that line of questioning, and the state 
resumed cross-examination by again questioning about Olsen's 
involvement in the criminal justice system, either in the adult or 
the juvenile courts (T. 165). 
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Later in the trial the defense again sought to exclude 
evidence of prior criminal conduct on the part of Olsen, A motion 
in limine was made to prohibit the state from introducing evidence 
of other crimes and wrongdoing (T. 188) • The defense wanted to 
present evidence of the escape from custody by Olsen without 
opening the door for the state to introduce evidence of other 
crimes (T. 189-90). Initially, the trial court indicated that it 
would not grant the motion (T. 188), but then ruled that the state 
would not be able to introduce evidence of prior convictions of 
felonies if the defense limited its presentation to that of the 
escape by Olsen (T. 190). In its ruling the court indicated 
introduction of prior convictions by defense experts would open the 
door to comment by the prosecution (T. 190). 
Olsen's escape was not mentioned by the defense during 
the trial and prior criminal conduct was not disclosed by 
defendant's expert witness on direct examination. However, the 
prosecution clearly conveyed to the jury the fact that Olsen had 
been previously involved with both the juvenile justice system and 
the adult criminal system. Dr. Robert J. Howell was called by the 
defense to address the insanity issue (T. 192). During cross-
examination of Dr. Howell, the state inquired concerning 
appearances by Olsen in the criminal justice system, making 
specific references to the juvenile court (T. 230). The prosecution 
continued to explore that topic by making reference to one criminal 
forum or another (T. 231). The following sequence of questions and 
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answers occurred between the prosecutor and Dr. Howell (T. 230): 
PROSECUTOR: And isn't it also true that every time that 
there has been a psychological testing done of this 
defendant, it has been done in conjunction with his 
appearances in the criminal justice system? 
DR. HOWELL: That is not true. 
PROSECUTOR: When, otherwise, has it been done? 
DR. HOWELL: You said psychological. Well when he went 
to LDS Hospital, that wasn't true. When he went to 
Mountain View, that wasn't true. 
PROSECUTOR: Isn't it true that he was under the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court at that time? 
DR. HOWELL: He was under the jurisdiction of the 
Juvenile Court. That's true. 
PROSECUTOR: And isn't that where we deal with juvenile 
criminals? Isn't that how he gets there? 
DR. HOWELL: Ah, well, I'm a little hesitant. My 
impression is that he went to LDS Hospital at the behest 
of his parents, rather than Juvenile Court. I might be 
wrong on that, but I don't think so. I think it was his 
parents that put him there. Now it's true that he was 
under the jurisdiction, but that's why I hesitated on it. 
I think that was the parents that made that decision. 
The prosecution again mentioned prior criminal conduct by 
Olsen moments later during cross-examination of Dr. Howell with the 
following (T. 231): 
PROSECUTOR: Well, and so that brings us back to the fact 
that this young man is depressed and he's been depressed 
since he was 15-years-old? 
DR. HOWELL: That's correct. 
PROSECUTOR: And that's what everything shows. Even 
though it may have been in conjunction with his 
appearances in one criminal forum or another, he's been 
depressed? 
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DR. HOWELL: I would rather say he's had a major 
depression, rather than say he's been depressed. They're 
not the same thing. 
Dr. Robert R. Wootton, a psychologist, was called by the 
state as a rebuttal witness concerning the issue of insanity. 
During that examination the state elicited from Dr. Wootton a 
comment regarding a history of other criminal behavior on the part 
of Olsen (T. 261). 
Rules 404 and 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, preclude the 
use of prior conduct to assert that a defendant has a criminal 
predisposition. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986). A 
prior conviction is generally admissible only when the conviction 
specifically reflects upon a defendant's veracity under 
circumstances where the defendant testifies. State v. Bruce, 779 
P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989). 
Rule 609(d) specifically excludes evidence of prior juvenile 
adjudications. 
The effort by the state to present information to the 
jury of prior juvenile and adult criminal conduct on the part of 
Olsen was clearly in contravention of the ruling of the trial court 
in response to the motion in limine. The state did not attempt to 
justify the introduction of evidence of other crimes under Rule 
404(b) which allows introduction of evidence of that nature to show 
"proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
Furthermore, evidence of other criminal conduct on the part of 
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Olsen was not necessary to develop the expert opinions of the 
doctors who testified, even assuming admissibility under that 
theory. The prosecution simply injected leading and editorial 
comment so as to disclose improper and harmful information to the 
jury. 
Evidence of other crimes is not admissible where the 
purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character. 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978). Admission of such 
evidence is presumed prejudicial. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 728 
(Utah 1985). The prejudice to Olsen by allowing the jury to hear 
repeated references to prior criminal conduct is compounded when 
considered in light of the pervasive pretrial publicity which the 
case attracted and the fact that the case presented the single 
issue of Olsen's state of mind. 
The prosecution cannot show that the defendant has been 
arrested, indicted, convicted, or imprisoned for another 
crime. 
The rule prohibiting evidence of another crime is equally 
applicable whether the evidence is elicited from a 
witness for the prosecution or from the defendant 
himself, and the rule applies without regard to whether 
such other crime was a completed crime or a criminal 
attempt. It is likewise immaterial whether evidence of 
other crimes is presented by direct statements or by 
implication. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 14th Ed. Vol. 
1, §178, pp. 750 & 751. 
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POINT III 
COMMENT UPON DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT WAS PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT AND PLAIN ERROR. 
Olsen did not introduce evidence of his escape. The 
opinions of his expert witness were developed without comment upon 
prior criminal activity. The court had granted the defense motion 
in limine. Nevertheless, the prosecutor repeatedly embellished his 
questions with comments about prior criminal activity. He did so 
during cross-examination of defendant's expert, and allowed his own 
expert to do so on direct. The defense did not object except for 
the earlier bench conference and the motion in limine. 
The test to determine whether a prosecutor's statements 
are improper is whether the remarks call "to the jurors' attention 
matters which they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching a verdict." State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 
1982). Improper comments by the prosecution will require reversal 
if they are determined to be harmful. State v. Emmett, 839 P. 2d 781 
(Utah 1992); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986). The concept of being "harmful" 
turns on whether the jurors are probably influenced by the remarks. 
State v. Tarafa, supra. The harmful prong of the test was 
discussed in State v. Tillman, supra, at 555, in the following 
language: 
A prosecutor's actions and remarks constitute misconduct 
that merits reversal if the actions or remarks call to 
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict, 
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and under the circumstances of the particular case, the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would 
have been a more favorable result for the defendant. 
It is obvious in the case at bar that the jurors were not 
entitled to consider any prior criminal history on the part of 
Olsen, Information of that nature had no probative value to the 
issues of the case. Furthermore, the defense had attempted to 
prevent comment about prior criminal activity by its motion in 
limine. The motion was granted by the trial court, but the 
prosecution ignored the ruling and made repeated and unnecessary 
statements about both juvenile court adjudications and adult 
criminal history. The remarks by the prosecutor were repetitious, 
flagrant, and unnecessary. The case presented a single issue of 
whether Olsen suffered a mental illness which negated the mens rea 
of the offense. Repeated comments about prior criminal conduct 
would tend to suggest to the jury that the claim of mental illness 
was merely his excuse for the moment since he had committed 
numerous prior crimes. Furthermore, the evidence as to the 
existence of the appropriate mens rea was close. Three medical 
experts testified. Each acknowledged that Olsen suffered from 
mental illness (Dr. Howell, at T. 214, 215, 219, and 221-24; Dr. 
Cundick, at T. 242, 245, and 249; Dr. Wootton, at T. 264-66). The 
defense expert concluded that the mental illness negated the mens 
rea (T. 221-24). Dr. Cundick, called by the prosecution, concluded 
that Olsen intended to cause injury to the victim, but that he did 
not intend to kill him (T. 242, 249-50). The verdict of "guilty of 
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murder and mentally ill" also suggests that it was a close call for 
the jurors. 
In close cases, the substantive use of a prior conviction 
can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction...State 
v. Emmett, supra, at 786. 
If the bench conference called by the defense, and the 
later motion in limine, are insufficient to preserve the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct for review on appeal, then the plain error 
doctrine should do so. "Plain error is error that is both harmful 
and obvious." State v. Emmett, supra, at 785. The record in this 
cause speaks for itself. The harm of the improper comments is 
obvious, as is the flagrancy of the remarks since they come on the 
heels of a ruling by the trial court which prohibited such evidence 
unless first introduced by the defense. The topic was fresh on the 
minds of both counsel and the court. This is a classic example of 
plain error. 
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he 
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of 
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one. Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). 
The comments of the prosecutor revealed to the jury that 
Olsen had been involved in the criminal justice system both as a 
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juvenile and as an adult (T. 165), that he had made appearances in 
the criminal justice system (T. 2 30), that he was under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court (T. 230), that he was a juvenile 
criminal (T. 230), and that he had appeared in one criminal form or 
another (T. 231). The prosecutor also elicited from one of the 
state's expert witness that Olsen had a history of other criminal 
behavior (T. 2 61). Those remarks do not reach the point of 
identifying a specific criminal conviction, but the impropriety is 
egually assailable. 
Where evidence of another crime is improper, it is 
likewise improper for the prosecution to insinuate or 
intimate in any way that such other crime has been 
committed, whether during the examination of witnesses or 
the address to the jury. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 
14th Ed. Vol. 1, §178, p. 751. 
Reference to a mug shot of a defendant is improper. 
State v. Jacobs, 382 P.2d 683 (Ariz 1963). Reference to a 
defendant as a parole or probation violator is not permissible. 
State v. Call, (1965) 8 Ohio App 2d 277, 37 Ohio Ops 2d 274, 220 
NE2d 130. Admission of front and profile photographs of a 
defendant with tape concealing words and figures at the bottom is 
prejudicial error. Barnes v. United States, (1966) 124 App DC 318, 
365 F.2d 509. 
In State v. Tarafa, supra, defendant testified in his own 
behalf and admitted a prior burglary conviction. During closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued that the prior burglary conviction 
tended to prove guilt for the charges then being tried. The court 
found those comments to be highly prejudicial, observing that the 
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jurors may well have been influenced by the remarks. The court 
stated (page 1373): 
The substantive use of defendant's prior bad acts and 
felonies added greatly to the likelihood that the jury 
inferred guilty knowledge from the character of 
defendant. Such use was highly prejudicial and under the 
circumstances of this case cannot be said to have been 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The comments found to be improper in Tarafa were less 
egregious than those in the instant matter. The jurors in this 
case were exposed to extensive pretrial publicity. Many 
acknowledged having knowledge of the facts of the case during voir 
dire. The comments by the prosecutor added significant damage to 
an already fragile situation. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ABUSE SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT 
The defense sought to introduce evidence by testimony of 
Olsen's mother of mental and physical abuse suffered by Olsen at 
the hands of his father (T. 153-55). The court interposed its own 
objection to that evidence on grounds of relevance (T. 156). As 
questioning resumed, the court solicited an objection from the 
prosecutor (T. 156). The objection was made and sustained (T. 
157). While a few instances of abuse were admitted, most of the 
incidents which the defense sought to adduce were excluded. The 
defense thereafter proffered what the testimony would have been (T. 
175-80). 
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The excluded evidence was probative of Olsen's ability to 
form the specific intent to commit the homicide. The defense 
argued that the childhood abuse related directly to the diagnosis 
of mental illness (T. 157) and advised the court that its expert 
witness had relied upon the existence of the abuse in reaching his 
opinion (T. 173). Defense counsel reasoned with the court 
regarding the relevancy of the abuse evidence (T. 174): 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If a doctor says that the father abused 
the boy and that that abuse was a contributing factor to 
mental illness, I think the jury is entitled to know. First 
they're entitled to weigh the opinion of the doctor and 
whether it has a justifiable basis. But I think they're also 
entitled to know that that incident is true because that lends 
weight and credibility to the expert opinion. 
The court took the unusual position that the doctors 
could testify about the childhood abuse to the extent it supported 
their expert opinions, but found it not relevant when coming from 
a witness with direct knowledge (T. 173-74). 
Dr. Howell considered and relied upon the earlier abuse 
in forming his opinions (T. 198, 207, 208, 226 and 227). A 
dialogue between Dr. Howell and the prosecutor on cross-examination 
demonstrates the reliance and the substantial nature of the abuse. 
It also reveals an attack by the prosecution upon the credibility 
of the evidence concerning abuse, the very thing the defense sought 
to avoid by its introduction (T. 229-30). 
PROSECUTOR: Isn't it true that you base a substantial part of 
your analysis of Mr. Olsen's situation on a reported 200 
different times that he was abused by his father? 
DR. HOWELL: I paid attention to that. 
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PROSECUTOR: And isn't it true that in attempting to document 
that, the only thing you have is the word of him and his 
mother? 
DR. HOWELL: That's correct. Well—and it shows up in other 
reports. But again, that's where it comes from. 
PROSECUTOR: It comes from them? 
DR. HOWELL: Yes. I think that's fair. 
During closing argument the prosecutor again asserted 
that Olsen and his mother had fabricated claims of child abuse by 
the father, stating that "none of them are on any record." (T. 
299). The state's contention was that Olsen's mental illness, and 
hence, lack of intent to commit the homicide, could not flow from 
child abuse because no such abuse occurred. This argument 
acknowledges the relevancy of that evidence. 
Dr. Cundick, one of the state's expert witnesses, 
testified that he considered earlier abuse to Olsen in his study 
(T. 250-52). He concluded that Olsen had suffered psychological 
trauma (T. 251), and that organic brain damage could not be ruled 
out (T. 252). 
Dr. Wootton, also called as an expert by the state (T. 
254), testified that he was very concerned about brain damage (T. 
258), but concluded that testing by other professionals indicated 
no such damage (T. 259), a view not shared by Drs. Howell and 
Cundick. 
In State v. Miller, 677 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, "[w]hen a specific intent or purpose is 
an element of the crime charged, 'basic rules of evidence 
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pertaining to materiality and relevance require that a defendant 
have the right to adduce evidence which would tend to disprove the 
existence of a specific intent.'" Citing State v. Sessions, 645 
P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982). The Court then held that the trial 
court in Miller erroneously excluded evidence which the defendant 
sought to present which would have substantiated his contention 
that he could not form the specific intent necessary to commit the 
conspiracy alleged in that case. The evidence excluded would have 
revealed a history of psychiatric care since childhood. 
In State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1986), the supreme 
court reiterated the principles of Miller and Sessions. In Smith 
the defendant advanced the dubious argument that he would not have 
knowingly pawned stolen rifles because he was afraid of returning 
to prison. To support that assertion he offered testimony that 
prison would aggravate his emphysema and tuberculosis, and that he 
believed his parole could be revoked on mere suspicion of criminal 
conduct. The evidence was excluded by the trial court as 
irrelevant. Finding error, the supreme court quoted Rule 1(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, that "evidence having any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove the existence of any material fact" is 
relevant, and added that "[t]he tendency need not be particularly 
strong." Smith, at 1015. 
Although a judge has discretion in ruling on relevancy, 
that discretion should be exercised with considerable 
liberality when the issue is motive because a wide 
latitude of evidence is relevant and hence admissible to 
prove motive. Smith, at 1016. 
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In this case, the trial court's exclusion of Mrs. Olsen's 
testimony was improper. The evidence concerned the sole issue in 
the case, whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to 
commit the homicide. The testimony which the defense sought to 
elicit from Mrs. Olsen would have substantiated the defense claim 
that Olsen suffered so much physical abuse during the course of his 
childhood that he may have either been brain damaged or his 
judgment may have been so significantly impaired that he could not 
think rationally on the evening of the homicide. Additionally, the 
evidence would have demonstrated that when he was wrestled to the 
ground and struck on the head by the victim, Olsen had a 
substantial basis for mentally transferring his hatred for his 
father to the victim and that his subsequent actions were really 
directed at his father. An eye witness described the fight between 
Olsen and the victim (T. 106-7). As a teenager, Olsen had a 
similar encounter with his father (T. 160-1). After the homicide 
Olsen stated to his mother that the altercation with the victim 
brought to mind the earlier beating by the father (T. 164). 
Defendant's expert concluded "[tjhere's a symbolic significance to 
being hit on the head because when that happens, he [Olsen] sees 
himself as once again being hit by his father..." The excluded 
evidence was not of marginal weight as in Smith. It was the chief 
ingredient of Olsen's case. 
33 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY 
Olsen recognizes the reguirement to marshall the evidence 
which supports the guilty verdict in a sufficiency of the evidence 
argument. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). In 
this case, the evidence was uncontroverted that Olsen committed the 
homicide by stabbing the victim with a knife. Accordingly, his 
argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict 
focuses upon the mens rea element. The state contended that Olsen 
"intentionally or knowingly" caused the death of the victim, or in 
the alternative, that he intended "to cause serious bodily injury" 
to the victim (T. 1, 261). Those intent elements are consistent 
with UCA §7 6-5-203, which proscribes the crime of murder. The 
prosecutor acknowledged that the case presented the singular issue 
of Olsen's state of mind. In closing argument, he stated that 
"[t]he only real issue that's been raised is the defendant's 
capacity to know and appreciate what he was doing..." (T. 279-80). 
The conduct of Olsen was available to infer state of 
mind. He had been drinking. One witness described his mood as 
belligerent. He encountered the victim and provoked an argument 
and a fight. He was violently subdued by the victim, and 
immediately went to his home to obtain a knife. He returned to the 
location of the victim, armed with the knife, aggressively pursuing 
and stabbing him. The state argued those facts in closing (T. 
282) . 
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The other significant body of evidence which supports the 
verdict of the jury is the expert opinion of Dr. Wootton, and to a 
lesser degree, the expert opinion of Dr. Cundick. Dr. Wootton 
acknowledged that Olsen suffered from the mental illness of major 
depression (T. 260), that he was the victim of abuse himself (T. 
261), and that his mental illness was a form of insanity (T. 262). 
He found indications of depression on the part of Olsen as early as 
age 15, and observed that he exhibited psychotic features (T. 264-
5). However, his ultimate conclusion was that Olsen, despite his 
mental illness or insanity, was not unaware of his actions in 
causing the death of the victim (T. 261-2). 
The testimony of Dr. Cundick supported one of the 
alternative intent elements, but not the other. He concluded that 
Olsen intended to assault the victim, but that he did not intend to 
kill him (T. 242). 
Despite his ultimate opinion, there is much in the 
testimony of Dr. Cundick to support Olsen's claim that he lacked 
knowledge and understanding of his conduct. Dr. Cundick confirmed 
that Olsen suffered from mental illness, a long history of 
depression, major depression, that he was alcohol dependent, that 
he was a polysubstance abuser, that he had borderline intelligence, 
and that he had anti-social characteristics (T. 240). He expressed 
the view that Olsen had an I.Q. of 76, equivalent to a twelve year 
old, and that his mental age of twelve years was constant (T. 247-
49). He was not able to rule out organic brain damage (T. 252), 
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and he postulated that Olsen's lack of memory in retrieving the 
knife following the first encounter with the victim could have been 
due from true amnesia, although he acknowledged that the claim of 
lack of memory could have been a fabrication (T. 252). Dr. Cundick 
also testified that he diagnosed Olsen as suffering from diminished 
mental capacity (T. 249). 
The unanimous view of the expert witnesses that Olsen was 
mentally ill received credence from the fact that he had been 
hospitalized at the Utah State Hospital for approximately one year 
before the time of trial because of findings that he was 
incompetent. Indeed, Dr. Wootton, the state's strongest expert 
witness, did one of the competency evaluations which reported a 
finding of no competency (T. 255-56). 
Olsen claims that he suffered from mental illness which 
negated any intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury to the 
victim. To support that claim, Olsen offered evidence of 
significant abuse received at the hands of his father when a child, 
and the confirming view of his expert witness. The testimony of 
his expert was admitted, but evidence of the child abuse was 
excluded, except for some limited details. 
Defendant's expert concluded that Olsen did have a 
defense of diminished capacity which warranted a verdict of 
manslaughter (T. 221-24). He expressed the opinion that Olsen's 
state of mind at the time of the homicide was one of gaining 
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revenge upon his father (T. 221), a classic M'Naghten defense.1 
Because of the way that the insanity or diminished mental 
capacity defense is raised, the prosecution must prove requisite 
mental capacity to commit the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 
after the defendant has raised the defense. State v. Romero, 684 
P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1984). Romero also states that an appellate 
court may determine the question of a defendant's mental capacity 
as of the time of the offense. Therefore, in contrast to other 
sufficiency issues, when a defendant argues that he did not have 
the mental capacity to form the requisite intent, Romero indicates 
that an appellate court may review the issue de novo. 
Olsen had been mentally ill since the age of 15. His 
history of treatment for mental illness was extensive. The three 
expert witnesses agreed that he suffered from mental illness, but 
disagreed markedly as to whether Olsen had the requisite intent to 
commit the homicide. The evidence in its totality fell far short 
of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Olsen knew and understood 
the nature of his conduct when he attacked the victim. 
CONCLUSION 
Olsen's trial was fraught with error. He was tried to a 
1M'Naghten's Case, 1 Car & K 130, 8 Scott NR 595, 10 Clark & 
F 200, 8 Eng Rep 718. Daniel M'Naghten killed Edward Drumond 
believing him to be the Prime Minister. He suffered from insane 
delusions. That defense was not available to Olsen because it was 
abolished by the enactment of UCA §76-2-305 in 1983. However, that 
statutory provision may be unconstitutional. Olsen did not raise 
a constitutional claim, but the issue is presently before the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Herrera and State v. Sweezey, Case Nos. 
920209 and 920265, respectively. 
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jury which had been exposed to extensive and damaging pretrial 
publicity. Highly prejudicial evidence concerning prior criminal 
history was admitted by the court, and interjected by the 
prosecutor. Favorable and relevant evidence concerning prior child 
abuse, essential to develop Olsen's mental illness defense, was 
improperly excluded. Even with those handicaps, the evidence 
available for the jury concerning the mens rea element was 
conflicting and inconclusive, and far short of meeting the burden 
of the prosecution to show the requisite mental state beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reversal and remand for a new trial are 
requested. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
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